Introduction

            The “internationalization” of domestic economies through economic liberalization policies has had profound consequences on national political economies throughout the developing world.  The precise mechanisms by which international economic exposure alters domestic social organization remain contested, with some scholars pointing to world prices and others stressing contextually specific institutional structures in shaping local responses.  On what basis do social constituencies form in favor of protecting or reconstructing the national market?  What processes unravel prior coalitions and facilitate the construction of new alliances around changed economic realities?  This project aims to explore these questions in Morocco and Tunisia, where recently accelerated economic liberalization programs reducing domestic tariffs and subsidies have elicited vocal responses from societal interests and promise to effect important shifts in the two regimes’ social foundations.  Increasingly bifurcated bourgeoisies and labor movements -- split between those continuing to focus on the local market and new segments of entrepreneurs and workers benefiting from “off-shore” status -- suggest emerging fundamental cleavages that the Moroccan and Tunisian states must accommodate.  This doctoral research aims to test the relative importance of a “price logic” versus an “institutional logic” in the breakdown of the post-independence coalition for the national market and the construction of new social foundations in an internationalized context.

 

II.  Negotiating the new economy:  local responses to internationalization

            A growing theoretical literature on internationalization comprises divergent understandings of the ways that international economic pressures filter into domestic contexts and elicit responses from social actors.  Analysts emphasizing the role of prices argue that incentives from global markets, translated through price signals, increasingly penetrate domestic economies directly, inducing actors to base their claims on “objective” economic interests and organize themselves accordingly (Rogowski 1989; Frieden and Rogowski 1995).  Because prices present varied incentives for different industries, domestic economic interests react on sectoral lines,* suggesting the declining salience of broader aggregations such as class and predicting similar social responses in diverse national contexts.  Yet the mere recognition of common economic interest does not ensure its politically organized expression, exposing a weakness in such approaches (Shafer 1994, 1997). 

            Preliminary research on the Moroccan and Tunisian textile/clothing sectors indicates that interest-based models offer important insights into shifting labor and business cleavage patterns but cannot provide comprehensive explanations.  Although external exposure has fragmented the diverse sub-components of the textile/clothing industry along similar lines in Morocco and Tunisia, alliance patterns and organizational strategies among textile industrialists differ substantially in the two countries, revealing further limitations of price-based models.  In Tunisia, declining trade protectionism has resulted in deep splits with resistance to liberalization framed on clear sub-industrial lines, in particular pitting thread spinners against weavers.  Moroccan spinners and weavers have not only formed an alliance in the national textile federation but, paradoxically, are calling for accelerated liberalization measures.

            To trace developing social cleavages and alliances, institutionalist approaches would situate decision-making in a domestic institutional context.  Focusing largely on cases of industrialized countries, these interpretations stress the key role of long-standing local institutions in mediating international economic stimuli (Zysman 1983, Hall 1984, Berger and Dore 1996).  Another strain of institutionalist approaches points to the role of social networks in shaping behavior (Rosenthal 1984, Granovetter 1985, Hedstrom 1994), an important focus since family ownership is the primary basis of Moroccan and Tunisian firm structures (Sabah 1987, Nabli and Nugent 1989, Saadi 1989, Denieuil 1992).  Thus, the project will consider the role of both formal political and informal family-based institutions in molding responses to trade liberalization.  Nonetheless, institutionalist approaches also exhibit important limitations.  Examining institutions as static entities is problematic, particularly for countries where the twin processes of state-building and constructing the national market have occurred recently with the result that international capital flows can rapidly undercut “strong” states and social groups (Chaudhry 1993, 1997).  This research therefore focuses on how business and labor groups form alliances in an institutional context reconstituted by external pressures. 

 

III.  The Cases:  Morocco and Tunisia

            To examine the new cleavages arising from and strategic responses to economic opening I selected Morocco and Tunisia as cases and, within these countries, the textile and electronics sectors.  Both countries have initiated similar trade and financial liberalization programs since the mid-1980s, including bilateral trade agreements with the European Community (EC), making them appropriate cases to explore the domestic repercussions of international economic exposure.  Furthermore, the two countries feature similar economic profiles, facilitating a comparison of Moroccan and Tunisian sector-based reactions to economic liberalization.  Finally, Moroccan and Tunisian state and institutional structures differ significantly, permitting an assessment of the role of institutions in shaping new social accommodations.  The analysis will focus on several categories of institutions that vary substantially across the two countries and potentially shape domestic strategies, notably business and labor associations, state agencies and their relationships to these groups, and family networks.  In Morocco, several labor unions compete for members and a small elite with intimate links to the palace dominates the economy through a series of integrated holding companies (Saadi 1989; Henry 1995; Leveau.and Bennani-Chraïbi 1996).  In Tunisia, on the other hand, a peak-level labor organization represents all segments of workers and state-business relations are more distant (Alexander1996; Bellin, 1991; Henry 1995).  Moreover, family networks are particularly important in the Moroccan case, where a small number of elite families benefit from and potentially exert influence on state policies (Saadi 1989, Sabah 1987).  Focusing on common sectors in the two institutionally different countries enables a comparison of the ways that different state and societal institutional legacies mediate global economic pressures while holding sectoral differences constant.

            The choice of textile/clothing production and electronics assembly is both theory-driven and inspired by empirical circumstances.  Based largely on deductive reasoning, price-based models make testable predictions about industrial responses to liberalization, forecasting that reactions depend on market orientation (domestic or international, export or non-competitive), relative factor mobility and the degree of production flexibility.  Such predictions would suggest that most textile sector interests, which traditionally targeted local markets, would attempt to block liberalization and preserve privileged market access.  Industrialists in the electronics industry, a booming export-oriented industry, on the other hand, would favor greater access to foreign markets.  Emphasizing national diversity, institutionalist approaches would predict that strategic responses and alliance patterns among business and labor groups would vary in the two countries.  Empirically, their substantial importance in the Moroccan and Tunisian economies and clear linkages to international economic conditions justify the focus on the textile and electronics industries.  The rise of off-shore enterprises, particularly in electronics, permits an analysis of the political implications of the rise of a new “post-Fordist” for economies with entrenched interests benefiting from protectionist policies (Piore and Sabel 1984; Jessop 1994; Smith 1994). 

 

IV.   Proposed Field Research

            During the 1997-1998 academic year I spent five months conducting preliminary research as part of a grant from the International Predissertation Fellowship Program of the Social Science Research Council.  This preliminary research enabled me to construct a basic account of the Moroccan and Tunisian economic liberalization programs, determine which sectors were particularly affected by the reforms, establish extensive contacts in the Moroccan and Tunisian private sectors and academic communities, and narrow down my research interests.  The experience, an essential backdrop to further research, demonstrated that a thorough grasp of the subject and comprehensive data collection will require substantial additional time in the field.  Thus, I propose to conduct field research in Morocco and Tunisia for nine months beginning in Summer 1999.

            Constructing a comprehensive account of Moroccan and Tunisian liberalization, a crucial step to determine the precise nature of relevant international economic pressures, calls for primary research in government archives.  I have already gathered substantial information from international institutions and documentation from the official bulletins of the Moroccan and Tunisian governments.  But detailed knowledge of changes in tax and investment codes affecting the textile/clothing and electronics sectors is also essential.  This information is available at government ministries, business association headquarters, sectoral organizations, and state export promotion and industrial investment agencies. 

            Collecting data on emerging divisions and coalitional patterns within these industries will rely largely on extensive in-depth interviews with industrialists, labor representatives, officials from UTICA and CGEM and industry-specific organizations, and officials from the Moroccan and Tunisian Ministries of Commerce and Finance.  To obtain basic firm information in advance, open-ended questionnaires would precede meetings with industrialists and interviews would consist of a uniform set of open-ended questions.  (Preliminary interviews demonstrated that standardized, closed-ended questionnaires were not helpful.)  Attending industry-wide meetings and trade expositions is also essential because it affords the opportunity to observe economic actors interact, although it cannot substitute for personal interviews.  Tracing industrial responses to liberalization would focus on specific political strategies articulated by key actors instead of imputing preferences from outcomes.  Gathering information on organizational responses to trade liberalization in the two sectors will also entail comprehensive reviews of the local economic press as well as academic journals in the two countries.

            In order to understand the domestic political economic changes arising from the prospect of increased international exposure, it is essential to construct a thorough picture of the pre-liberalization structures of business-labor-government relations in the textile/clothing sector and to trace the prior activities of entrepreneurs in the electronics sector.  This account would largely rely on documents from government ministries and personal interviews and would also draw on Western and North African secondary source material and advice from Moroccan and Tunisian academics.

            The opportunity to conduct nine months of in-depth field research in Morocco and Tunisia would be invaluable for my project.  Investigating the profound changes wrought by liberalization not only can illuminate the dynamics of the reconstitution of these two national economies but also promises to offer insights relevant to other cases in the developing world.

 

Selected Bibliography

 

Alexander, Christopher.  “Trade union responses to the changing international economy.”  In The new global economy: North African responses.  Edited by Dirk Vandevalle.  New York: St. Martin’s, 1996. 

 

Anderson, Lisa.  The state and social transformation in Tunisia and Libya, 1830-1980.  Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1986. 

 

Bellin, Eva.  Civil society resurgent? State and social classes in Tunisia.  Ph.D. dissertation.  Princeton University.  1991. 

 

Berger, Suzanne and Ronald Dore, eds.  National diversity and global capitalism.  Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996. 

 

Chaudhry, Kiren Aziz.  “The myths of the market and the common history of late developers.”  In Politics and society 21, 3(September 1993): 245-74. 

 

Chaudhry, Kiren Aziz.  The price of wealth: economies and institutions in the Middle East.  Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997. 

 

Frieden Jeffry and Ronald Rogowski.  “The impact of the international economy on national policies: an analytical overview.”  In Internationalization and domestic politics.  Edited by Robert O. Keohane and Helen Milner.  New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996. 

 

Gourevitch, Peter.  Politics in hard times: comparative responses to international economic crisis.  Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986. 

 

Granovetter, Mark.  “Economic action and social structure: the problem of embeddedness.”  In American journal of sociology 91, 3(November 1985): 481-510. 

 

Haggard, Stephan, Sylvia Maxfield, and Ben Ross Schneider.  “Theories of business and business-state relations.”  In Business and the state in developing countries.  Edited by Sylvia Maxfield and Ben Ross Schneider.  Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997. 

 

Hall, Peter.  Governing the economy: the politics of state intervention in Britain and France.  New York: Oxford University Press, 1986. 

 

Harik, Iliya.  “Privatization and development in Tunisia.” In Privatization and liberalization in the Middle East.  Edited by Iliya Harik and Denis J. Sullivan.  Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992.

 

Hedstrom, P.  “Contagious collectivities: on the spatial diffusion of Swedish trade unions, 1890-1940.”  American journal of sociology 99, 5(1994): 1157-79.

 

Henry, Clement M.  The Mediterranean debt crescent: money and power in Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, and Turkey.  Gainesville, Florida: University Press of Florida, 1995. 

 

Jessop, Bob.  “Post-Fordism and the state.”  In Post-Fordism: a reader.  Edited by Ash Amin.  Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, 1994. 

 

Joffé, George.  “The political economy of privatisation in Morocco.”  In Moroccan Studies 1(1991): 53-68. 

 

Leveau, Rémy and Mounia Bennani-Chraibi.  “Maroc 1996: institutions, économie, société.”  In Acteurs et Espaces Politiques au Maroc et en Turquie.  Programme de recherche Islam et Modernité, Centre Marc Bloch, No. 15.  Berlin: Centre Marc Bloch, 1996. 

 

Milner, Helen V. and Robert O. Keohane.  “Internationalization and domestic politics: an introduction.”  In Internationalization and domestic politics.  Edited by Robert O. Keohane and Helen Milner.  New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996. 

 

Nabli, Mustapha K. and Jeffrey B. Nugent, eds.  The New Institutional Economics and development: theory and application to Tunisia.  New York: Elsevier, 1987.

 

Piore, Michael J. and Charles F. Sabel.  The second industrial divide: possibilities for prosperity.  New York: Basic Books, 1984. 

 

Rogowski, Ronald.  Commerce and coalitions: how trade affects domestic political alignments.  Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989. 

 

Rosenthal, N. et. al.  “Social movements and network analysis.”  American journal of sociology 90, 5(1985): 1022-54. 

 

Saâdi, Mohamed Saïd.  Les groupes financiers au Maroc.  Casablanca: Editions Okad, 1989. 

 

Shafer, Michael.  Winners and losers: how sectors shape the developmental prospects of states.  Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994. 

 

Smith, Gavin.  “Toward an ethnography of idiosyncratic forms of livelihood.”  In IJURR 18, 1(1994): 71-85. 

 

Smith, W. Rand.  “International economy and state strategies: recent work in comparative political economy.”  In Comparative politics 25, 3(April 1993): 351-72. 

 

Vitalis, Robert.  “Business conflict, collaboration, and privilege in interwar Egypt.”  In State power and social forces: domination and transformation in the third world.  Edited by Joel S. Migdal, Atul Kohli and Vivienne Shue.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. 

 

Waterbury, John.  “Twilight of the state bourgeoisie?”  In International journal of Middle East studies 23(1991): 1-17. 

 

Zartman, I. William, ed.  The political economy of Morocco.  New York: Praeger, 1987. 

 

Zartman, I. William, ed.  Tunisia: the political economy of reform.  Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Riener, 1991.

 

Zysman, John.  Governments, markets and growth.  Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983.